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Radical feminism and the future

January 24, 2012

It is common to say that something is good in theory but not in practice. I always want to say, then it is not such a good theory, is it?

Catharine A. MacKinnon

I have reservations about framing “revolution” as the natural or inevitable conclusion of radical feminist theorizing. It seems generally accepted that “revolution” will cause the total destruction of all existing social institutions because revolution is only means of eliminating the “root” of female oppression. Thoughts which support revolution are therefore “radical;” everything short of that is not-radical. Not-radical thinking has no place in “radical” feminism. I’ve been turning these assumptions over and over in my mind. The belief that female liberation through “revolution” is even possible leaves many unanswered questions for me.

Read more…

Lesbian Friendship, by Claudia Card @ Feminist Reading Group

January 18, 2012

Yeah, I posted an article for us to discuss @Feminist Reading Group! Oh sisters, I love love love this one!! It is sooo worth your time to read all the words. And yes, hetero-women can also read, comment, and find value in the analysis. She talks about TAIL WAGGING behavior in dogs as a manifestation of mutual affinity, ok? Now that’s some REAL shit.

EXCERPT! Originally published as Chapter 5 in Lesbian Choices, 1995.

Like a life, friendship has a history: a beginning, a middle, and an end (if only because eventual death intervenes). Different activities may be more characteristic at different points in this history, although some continue throughout. Consider, for example, the “getting to know you” stage. Characteristic activities here are exposure and exploration, activities with potentialities for developing trust—provided nothing terribly untoward occurs during trial exposures and explorations. These are activities that may continue throughout the friendship. The friendship may become boring if they do not. Goodwill here is communicated by (perhaps, means) friendly interest and receptivity.

Other activities that evidence growing friendships are seeking each other out (sometimes for no special purpose) when fate happens not to conjoin you and manifesting joy at mutual encounters when it does (tail-wagging in dogs, people smile).

A natural next stage is defining one’s spaces, setting boundaries and gaining recognition of them. This may take trials and a few skirmishes. It also sets limits to (at least to the timing of) exposures and explorations begun earlier and to the aggressiveness and nature of contact-seeking. We might think of this stage as one of gaining, then maintaining, respect.

Once boundaries have gained respect, friends may move on more comfortably to mutual “grooming” or “stroking” rituals-pleasantries and small services beyond what utility requires. At least part of what feels good about the “grooming” or “stroking” is that it is done by the other person, not by just anyone, and that she chose you, not just anyone, to receive it. Like exposure and exploration, nurturing and grooming activities also ordinarily continue through a friendship. If boundaries have not been worked out, however, this activity risks being construed as, and might easily become, sexual. One response to the question how to “draw the line” between expressions of affection and sexual behavior is that without friendly background institutions, that is, rule-defined social practices, to define the social meanings of “grooming” or “stroking” rituals, individual understandings need to be reached at the stage of defining spaces in friendships between lesbians who could potentially become lovers. Here is a place where friendly background institutions can be useful in reducing troublesome ambiguity and needs for taking initiatives. Here is a place where lesbians are apt to feel the lack of what Adrienne Rich called “a common language.”45

(Caveat: I don’t like the “grooming” term…because of…you know, men.)

Gender I-dentity

January 10, 2012

I-dentity (aka trans) politics is fundamentally LIBERTARIAN. It is ahistorical and acontextual. It essentializes sex stereotypes by renaming them consensual “gender identities.” It invisibilizes power structures that give rise to female oppression. It is anti-feminist.

Also posted by Sargasso SeaLishraGallus MagNo AnodyneCathy BrennanLuckyaudaxillegorrilerof4bsaltnpeppaiameatingblueberriesSmashDavina

Let’s assume for a moment that gender *is* a function of the brain…

December 16, 2011

Let’s assume that gender is a real thing, like an objectively demonstrable something that can be evidenced by brain scans or other medical-type tests. This is not what I believe, of course, but it is a critical underpinning of trans* I-dentities and their presumed legitimacy.

Basically, certain behaviors and preferences that we understand as “masculine” or “feminine” can be scientifically, or biologically, traced to neurological structures. As such, these “expressions” of gender are not voluntary. They are hard-wired. They are inherent. They are essential. They are set-for-LIFE. They are pre-social. It is futile to resist the awesome power of your internally felt gender!!! Got it? Are you on this bandwagon? Good.

Wait a minute! I have a serious fucking problem with this. One of the most disturbing and destructive behavioral consistencies “expressed” by men– call them a sex or a gender, it doesn’t matter for my point– is VIOLENCE.

As a culture, we talk a lot about victims, who is being hurt, how they’re being hurt, etc, etc. We can even get into Oppression Olympics about who has it the worst! Attending to victims’ needs is important. Knowing, or figuring out, who is being targeted is important.

But what about the CAUSE? What about the “people” PERPETRATING the violence? WHO is doing this to us?

Oh, MEN. Also know as, humans born into male bodies.

Now, I’m not exactly a statistician, but I don’t need to be. Margins of error and methodological objections can’t touch proportions this alarming.

By this account, “the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe data show that in the U.S. and Europe, 85%-100% of people convicted of assault are men. And 90% of murders are committed by men. Men are by far the principal perpetrators of rape, war, torture, incest, sexual abuse, sexualized murder, and genocide.”

And, “In 2009-10, men were perpetrators in 91% of all violent incidents in England and Wales. The figures vary by type of incident: 81% for domestic violence, 86% for assault, 94% for wounding, 96% for mugging, 98% for robbery. Ministry of Justice figures for 2009 show men to be responsible for 98%, 92% and 89% of sexual offences, drug offences and criminal damage respectively. Of child sex offenders, 99% are male.” We could go on with this shit all day.

Violence is a behavior.

Violence is a behavior overwhelmingly enacted by male persons.

Violence is a gendered problem.

Now, assuming gender/gendered behavior is biologically rooted, this behavior is never gonna change. We’re stuck with it. It’s like, essential. As a result, framing gender as a function of nature actually lends support to the male exterminationism articulated in Solanas’s SCUM Manifesto. Men are irredeemable, evil pigs who need to be destroyed in order for women to live in peace: is that where everyone is going with this gender-is-biologically rooted bullshit? Cause that’s what it sounds like to me.

If sex-specific behaviors have a biological basis, then women need to take action *against* men. Like, yesterday. No more nicey-nice! That’s the only response that makes any sense! I sincerely do not understand how gender-essentialists are living with this cognitive dissonance. I’d be interested to know how they rationalize it away.

Female bodies and legislative exceptions for sex-segregation

December 7, 2011

Some women would like to avoid, or even exclude, “biology” from the debate about women’s need for sex-segregated space. Maybe they are convinced that the social experience of being groomed as a “woman” from birth (aka FAAB genderizing)– the primary source of women’s oppression– is sufficient justification for woman-only space. Maybe they are concerned about scientific explanations for the cause(s) of transsexuality and body-identity-integrity-disorder. Maybe they just don’t believe that sex-based biology is relevant to the female condition. Whatever the reason, we need to be very careful in disregarding the physical, biological, realities of female bodies.

The discussion about public accommodations– which often serves as a proxy for bathrooms and other sex-segregated spaces– now focuses on trans* I-dentities, self-definition, the importance of gendered expression, and the politics of inclusion. None of these issues address the reasons why women require specific public accommodations to be female-only: privacy, female safety from unwanted male sexualization while partially disrobed, and body-specific use of particular facilities. Trans advocates want us to believe that these are not legally justifiable concerns:

Although privacy may be an important cultural value, it is not a “real difference” of the kind courts demand when it requires that separate facilities be justified by real and demonstrative differences, as in race discrimination jurisprudence. Rather, it is a generally agreed upon cultural norm that justifies separate restrooms, and while it may be a norm that we all want enforced, it is not a real, biological difference. That separate restrooms are the best example that the Fourth Circuit could provide of separate facilities justified by real sexual differences illustrates once again that sexual differentiation takes place according to cultural gender norms, not biology.

From Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex From Gender, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, page unknown (1995).

(This passage is an anti-feminist classic! I will never tire of quoting it!)

Sexual differentiation has real bodily consequences that operate both in conjunction with and independently of cultural gender norms. A feminist defense of sex-segregated accommodations, such as bathrooms and locker rooms, must account for both reproduction-as-physical-reality and the embodied experience of being female.

Fortunately, I have discovered some explicit legislative support for single-sex restrictions in limited, but critical, “public accommodation” contexts. That’s right– enforcement of single-sex spaces is not merely a social custom. In many states, anti-discrimination statutes have recognized formal legislative exceptions to sex discrimination. In the words of Cathy Brennan, the law says it is rational to discriminate in some instances.

Let’s start with a really clear example from Connecticut, where you will recall there is also a gender identity override:

Sec. 46a-64. (Formerly Sec. 53-35). Discriminatory public accommodations practices prohibited. Penalty.

(b) (1) The provisions of this section with respect to the prohibition of sex discrimination shall not apply to (A) the rental of sleeping accommodations provided by associations and organizations which rent all such sleeping accommodations on a temporary or permanent basis for the exclusive use of persons of the same sex or (B) separate bathrooms or locker rooms based on sex.

My bold. Connecticut’s contextual specificity deserves attention. The statutory language does not explain the underlying rationale, but names three different kinds of places– depending on the expected activities– that the statute excludes from legally recognized sex discrimination: sleeping accommodations, bathrooms, and locker rooms. These are contexts of increased vulnerability by reason of unconsciousness or becoming partially disrobed.

Although Franke, in the quotation above, dismisses “privacy” as an insufficient justification for “separate facilities,” Hawaii– another state with gender-identity protections– has actually codified “personal rights of privacy as a legitimate cause for refusing to find sex discrimination under certain circumstances:

[§489-4] Exception, privacy requirements.

The provision of separate facilities or schedules for female and for male patrons does not constitute a discriminatory practice when such separate facilities or schedules for female and for male patrons are bona fide requirements to protect personal rights of privacy.

My bold. Now, as a feminist, I’ll be the first to admit that I find the vague, subjective, and highly contextual concept of “privacy” to be a tenuous, even dangerous, legal rationale upon which to rest any “right.” Still, one cannot ignore the strength of its precedent in American jurisprudence. Like it or not, privacy has been framed as the critical concept supporting women’s reproductive freedoms (See Griswold, Roe, and all related abortion cases for basic examples).

The right to bodily-related privacy is fundamental to American legal philosophy. Bathrooms, locker rooms, and sleeping accommodations are places where we expose parts of our bodies while changing clothes or evacuating our various bodily functions. If privacy isn’t relevant here, I don’t know where it is relevant!

It’s reasonable, then, that male bodies and female bodies have different spaces for doing these things. We live in a rape culture. The male gaze is everywhere men are. Male sexual predation is a major social problem. Safety first! Put aside the gender identity debate– there is no way in hell that males and females could unconditionally share “private” spaces such as bathrooms and locker rooms. Men as a class are just too dangerous to women as a class. The idea is unimaginable, really. Little girls walking into the bathroom while grown men have their dicks out at the urinal? No. Just N-O. Maybe in nature, but not in a cultural context where 1 in 6 women is the victim of sexual violence. Women as a class need and deserve, yes deserve, a reprieve from the voyeurism of the male gaze while we are attending to our bodily functions. Privacy necessitates sex-segregated bathrooms, locker rooms, and sleeping accommodations.

Here is another interesting example; Colorado’s legislative exception provides a standard by which to measure the appropriateness of sex segregation (bottom of page 23 in linked to pdf):

(3) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this section, it is not a discriminatory practice for a person to restrict admission to a place of public accommodation to individuals of one sex if such restriction has a bona fide relationship to the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of such place of public accommodation.

Interesting, right?? Ok, we have to prove a “bona fide relationship.” Or, as Franke says, “separate facilities justified by real sexual differences.” I can do that. Because multi-person bathroom “facilities” accommodate, specifically, male or female bodies. To some people this might seem very obvious. But something seems to have gotten lost while women were being shouted down and told to STFU about the secrecy of trans genitals. So, oh yeah, I’m gonna go there. Not only is the world literally pre-arranged to suit sex-segregation, it actually makes sense.

Urinals, right? They are intended for use by individuals who stand while urinating. This is primarily men, aka people with penises. Sure, I understand that some women can pee standing up, and that’s really cool. But I can’t. Most female bodied persons can’t. We prefer to sit down on a flushing toilet while urinating. Or squat over one, I guess. Regardless, women rarely use urinals for the purpose of urinating because our urethral structure is different. Men use urinals. Because they have penises. Just to be clear. And no, I don’t want to see that. When I walk into the bathroom, on the way to a stall, I do not want to see a penis. Many women, many UNDERAGE GIRLS, do not wish to see penises in the bathroom– even innocent ones doing their business at the urinal. No. Don’t want to see it. No. Cannot trust men. NO. Privacy. Safety. Comfort.

Now, let’s go to the women’s bathroom. All stalls, all the time. Good. Thank you. Ok, there I am, my female body is sitting on that toilet, in that stall, with my ass hanging out and my pants around my knees because I do not have a tubular urethral structure that I can casually stick through the fly of my jeans to pee. And oh hey, it’s that time of the month, now I have to attend to my menstrual process. It’s a female-body thing. You know, having to do with female reproduction. So I expect to see a small box attached to the wall where I can dispose of personal items that should not be flushed. Or maybe a miniature garbage can nearby. Something like that. So I can change my pad or tampon, or both, and dispose of the waste. Without flushing it. If you’ve even needed a little trash can in the bathroom and couldn’t find one, you know how necessary that is. Seriously. Non-menstruating persons (i.e., all humans who have or have had penises) have no physical need for this kind of “accommodation.” If I must take care of my menstrual needs in the presence of others– as I do at work several times every month– please do not ask me do it around male persons. Please! Male and female bodies are structurally different. Male and female bodies are socially different. Sex-segregation is a rational response and “has a bona fide relationship to the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of such place of public accommodation.”

Some kinds of sex-segregated facilities —such as bathrooms, locker rooms, and sleeping accommodations— are inarguably necessary for the sake of female privacy, comfort, and safety.  At the very least, the female right to ‘privacy’ is, and should remain, a legally protectable interest. Women cannot afford to be distracted by romantic post-modern ideals of unconditional ‘self-definition’ or to become fixated on a visionary, but wholly unrealistic, politic of inclusion. These issues are designed to, and have proven incredibly effective at, making invisible the physical realities of sex and the social realities of male sexual violence. Conversations about access to spaces of increased vulnerability reserved specifically for the female sex must remain focused on female rights– not male comfort, or even what males might be comfortable with in their own space. Women require particular kinds of public accommodations to be female-only for legally supportable reasons of privacy, female safety from unwanted male sexualization while partially disrobed, and body-specific use of particular facilities. Once again, sex matters.

Legal “sex” and the female condition.

December 5, 2011

[Tomorrow or the next day I plan to publish a post about biology and bathrooms. This here is a small introductory matter that revisits some previous analysis.]

Historically, it was presumed that sex had a “plain meaning.” This plain meaning did not require excessive analysis or debate. Sex just was. Objectively demonstrable reproductive differences between male and female bodies were taken for granted. Oh, those were the good ol’ days!

Enter trans politics and it’s erasure of female-bodied reality. Let’s revisit the seven enumerated sex/gender criteria featured in (at least) two different trans cases. First, from a petition filed in NYC (Berkley v. Farley) that challenges the surgical sex-change requirement for birth certificate revisions asserts:

7. In those forty years, the medical, scientific, legal, and psychological understandings of trans gender persons have progressed substantially. The mainstream view of these communities no longer equates sex with chromosomes or genitalia alone. Rather, it is now accepted that a person’s sex is determined by a host of factors,  including
chromosomes, (4)
gonads (ovaries or testes), (3)
hormonal secretions, (5)
internal reproductive organs, (1)
external genitalia, (2)
secondary sexual characteristics, (6) and
the brain sex or one’s self-identified sex. (7)

My bold, red numbers, and line spacing, above, to show consistency with the 2003 decision of The Court of Appeals in Maryland In re: Heilig (see page 8). [Or, if you prefer, my annotated version of the Heilig case.]

There is a recognized medical viewpoint that gender is not determined by any single criterion, but that the following seven factors may be relevant:

(1) Internal morphologic sex (seminal vesicles/prostate or vagina/uterus/fallopian tubes);

(2) External morphologic sex (genitalia);

(3) Gonadal sex (testes or ovaries);

(4) Chromosomal sex (presence or absence of Y chromosome);

(5) Hormonal sex (predominance of androgens or estrogens);

(6) Phenotypic sex (secondary sex characteristics, e.g. facial hair, breasts, body type); and

(7) Personal sexual identity.

My bold and red on the terms medical and gender.

Interestingly, the Berkley petition seeks to prove sex, while Heilig is focused on gender.* Does anyone else think the trans are a little confused about their messaging?? LOL! No, no, not all! Here’s what I said about all this in June:

Of the seven factors, all but ONE refer to objectively demonstrable physical criteria. Effectively, trans activists are arguing that the one subjective factor on the list– “the brain sex or one’s self-identified sex”– should OVERRIDE all of the others. . . . If that’s the only thing that counts, it kind of makes you wonder what the point of all those other criteria are, doesn’t it? Yeah, me too.

To be more specific, trans arguments about ‘sex’ are obsessively focused on factors 7 (I-dentity), 6 (secondary sex characteristics), 5 (hormones), and 2 (genitals). I’ve heard all the arguments a hundred times. Boooorrrring. To be honest, the trans-advocates are correct, none of these characteristics–even the objectively measurable ones– are of much importance or consequence. They are, with varying degrees of voluntary intervention, mutable, along with the “gendered” social perceptions that attach to them. The intended result of focusing on mutable characteristics and their social impact is to prevent us from thinking, even for a moment, that anything ELSE about ‘sex’ could possibly exist as critical to life and/or on a pre-social basis.
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But let’s switch the frame from trans people to women and talk about female bodies! Radical idea, right? Well, only factors 1 and 3 are relevant to female reproductive processes and vulnerability. Even chromosomes (4)– who cares!? I’ve never had mine tested. Chromosomes are immutable, yes, but do not guarantee fertility, and therefore, lack independent consequence [edit: of the kind I care about]. I don’t want to talk about them. Don’t even try to derail me with that shit!
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“Internal morphological sex” (1) matters. And gonads (3) matter. Because the proper INTERACTION between the two has serious physical consequences. The way mine work, I experience a regular monthly menstrual cycle. Frankly, it can be quite intrusive on my daily activities. Most people don’t want to hear about female menstruation (ewww, gross!), so it’s quite common t0 gloss over this important consequence  of internal morphological sex + gonads. Thanks for the erasure, yo.
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FEMALE reproductive functioning is simply not like any other metabolic system. Not only do reproductively female bodies endure the cyclical interference of our menstrual cycles (and menopause), but most fertile women can and do create new LIFE (aka a child) with their gonads and “internal morphological sex” organs. To use one’s ‘sex’ this way, to give Life is, well, a LIFE CHANGING reality. The knowledge that you could become unwittingly responsible– through accident or rape– for another person’s LIFE is incredible. It’s daunting. I don’t know how heterosexual women are supposed to enjoy PIV with that on our backs, but you can visit FCM’s blog to read more about that.
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Female reproductive organs and processes have physical consequences to female LIVES. Female fertility can not be constructed out of social interactions. Female fertility is biologically constructed with objectively demonstrable physical effects.
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Female reproductive reality, and its physical consequences, should be the lens through which we analyze the meaning of “sex. If the trans game is to deny reproductive relevancy to sex, the female goal must be to ensure that reproduction is not legally erased. Sex matters.
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Violence.

November 29, 2011

Violence is domination. Possibilities created out of violence are  sustainable only with more violence.

Violence cannot offer social transformation of the kind that may liberate us from, nor destroy, the forces that give rise to oppression.

Violence may be useful as a matter of survival, but not of a Revolution ignited by feminist values.

Dominating the Dominators is not freedom. It merely replicates the dynamic we seek to transcend.

Why I support the trans bill in Massachusetts.

November 16, 2011

The revised trans’ rights bill was voted on last night and passed the House 95-58. That’s good! YAY! Look at me, I’m supporting! Now it has to pass the Senate (oooh, it PASSED!). And then His Excellency Governor Deval Patrick will sign it into law. He has already committed himself to doing the honors.

Now, I finally got my hands on a copy of the REVISED bill. Thanks, Cathy Brennan! And now you have a copy of it too. Enjoy!

View this document on Scribd

Guess what? The “gender identity” definition looks just like Connecticut’s! (<<see analysis in link)

“Gender identity” shall mean a person’s gender-related identity, appearance or behavior, whether or not that gender-related identity, appearance or behavior is different from that traditionally associated with the person’s physiology or assigned sex at birth. Gender-related identity may be shown by providing evidence including, but not limited to, medical history, care or treatment of the gender-related identity, consistent and uniform assertion of the gender-related identity or any other evidence that the gender-related identity is sincerely held, as part of a person’s core identity; provided however, gender-related identity shall not be asserted for any improper purpose.

Please note that this is somewhat more restrictive than what was originally proposed. I do not like this Connecticut-version much better (because it still does not require objective evidence of a “gender identity”), but it’s a nod towards two of my primary concerns in regard to overbroad definitions of “gender identity;” namely, lack of proof and fraud by sex offenders or other males who would take advantage of this legislation to prey on females by invading female-only space.

The main reason I support this bill, however, is because it presents minimal risk to female rights and safety. Our feminist legal critique has focused on the public accommodations problem of “gender identity” legislation. The revised MA bill does not present a conflict in regard to sex-segregated public accommodations and male-bodied intrusions into these female-only spaces.

The bill applies, specifically, to contexts in which discrimination can have life-altering consequences. Contexts wherein discrimination has the power to change the course of your life and limit your economic opportunities– such as being fired or not hired for a job, or being evicted and/or denied housing. These are critically important institutionalized decisions with far-reaching personal consequences. I don’t really fancy myself a writer (I’m more of a conceptual theorist) and I’m short on time for detailed explanation, so I’ve made a little chart to summarize the distinction:

CONTEXT of anti-discrimination protection

Practical social CONSEQUENCE of legal protection

Employment

Economic stability and mobility

Housing

Prevention of homelessness

Credit

Property ownership

Public accommodations

Embarrassment or temporary discomfort

The long-term CONSEQUENCES of being denied access to the opposite sex’s bathroom in a public place is really NOT THE SAME AT ALL as being denied a job or housing or a mortgage. Trans supporters really need to get some perspective on this. Please!

Over the past 24, I have observed intense and very predictable online criticism from the trans community about the exclusion of public accommodations from this bill. As I say, they aren’t doing a nuanced analysis of the ramifications and/or dangers inherent to the different contexts they are discussing. This oversight is glaring and myopic. But you know what else? Trans supporters could learn a lot from the history of feminist legal advocacy. Humans-assigned-the-feminine-gender-at-birth have been chipping away, one tiny little step at a time, taking whatever legal progress or protections we can get, when we can get them. Property ownership. The vote. Birth control. Serving on juries. Abortion. Marital rape. Equal pay. Oh, oops, we don’t have equal pay yet! (See Lilly Ledbetter) Nor do women have the legal protection of a constitutional Equal Rights Amendment. That’s been going on for decades now. Trans advocacy groups have been taking up this bill with Massachusetts’ legislators for over six years. When you’re asking governmental representatives for help and they come back and say, hey I really tried but I can only get you part of what you want, you don’t say FUCK YOU. You say, THANK YOU. If something is that important to you, that real, take it. We will always have more work to do. Always. There is no total solution to the tyranny of hetero-normativity. Women. know. this.

Massachusetts trans bill: ACTION ALERT!

November 15, 2011

This morning my wife woke me up by announcing that she had received the following email:

——– Original message ——–
Subject: ACTION ALERT – Transgender Equal Rights Bill Vote THIS Week
From: MGLPC
To: << >>
CC:

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Calls to Legislators Needed Immediately!
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The Transgender Equal Rights Bill is scheduled to be voted on Tuesday or Wednesday of this week! We need everyone to call their state legislators and ask them to support the bill. MGLPC has worked for years in coalition with MTPC to pass legislation to protect  transgender residents from discrimination.

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Today the Judiciary Committee announced it will release a bill making it illegal to discriminate in employment, housing and credit against transgender individuals.  The bill provides important hate crimes protections as well.  The legislation will be voted by the full House and Senate on Tuesday or Wednesday.

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While this bill does not include all the protections we have fought for – specifically protections in public accommodations - it does constitute an important first step toward remedying discrimination against the transgender community in critically important areas.

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Our opponents are inundating the legislature with hateful calls and e-mails.  We need to counter their venom if we are to get this bill passed. Please call your state representative and state senator and ask them to vote for the Transgender Equal Rights Bill.  (e-mail links and other contact information can be found at
www.wheredoivotema.com [http://www.wheredoivotema.com])

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Your financial support allows MGLPC to work for important advancements and protections for the LGBT community. Please contribute to our work with an online contribution [redacted] or by sending one to:  MGLPC, POBox 246, State House, Boston, MA 02133.Thank you for your ongoing support, your caring and your activism.
Best,
Arline Isaacson & Gary Daffin
Co-Chairs
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Massachusetts Gay & Lesbian Political Caucus
P.O. Box 246, State House
Boston, Massachusetts 02133
617-248-0776
lobbyist@mglpc.org
My formatting (it was a messsss), my BOLD, my red.
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Oh yeah, I’m awake!
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NO PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS IN THIS BILL. Yeeeeee-HAW!! Now this is a bill I can support!!
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Employment, housing, and credit are substantially different contexts than bathrooms and locker rooms. So this is a wholly reasonable solution to the female-segregated space problem inherent to most “gender identity” anti-discrimination legislation: exempt (or refuse to include) spaces such as bathrooms and locker rooms. At least, it is a reasonable solution if the GBT(no L) Borg continues to refuse to get more specific with their definition of “gender identity” while denying that females have any legitimate interest in sex-segregated space.
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I do not know why public accommodations were removed from the initial Massachusetts proposal, but it is obviously for a political reason. I suspect that it is too publicly controversial. DUH. Because SEX and GENDER are NOT THE SAME THING. Almost everyone knows this. EXCEPT the pro-trans delusionists, of course. But we’ve been there, done that.
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I will share more information as it becomes available to me. I can’t find the text of the allegedly revised and newly released bill, but Ima keep looking!

R*pe. What is it?

October 2, 2011

There has been some talk recently about the FBI’s archaic definition of rape. The New York Times even covered the story this week. Let’s review.

The FBI provides guidance to states about criminal reporting. As in, what actually happened for the record on a national level. This guidance is published in the Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook (hereafter, the Handbook). The first version of the Handbook was issued in 1929, and the most recent version is dated 2004. Well, dontchyaknow some things never change! Including the definition of Forcible Rape:

Definition: The carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will.

Page 19.

Not-forcible rape does not exist in the Handbook. That’s right sisters, you better fight back or it was. not. rape. As you might expect, this forcibility requirement tops the list of feminist complaints about the FBI’s working definition of rape. But it’s only the beginning.

Another major complaint heard ’round the world is about the exclusion of victims from the definition of rape. By continuing to use the old-fashioned term “carnal knowledge” only females can be victims of “forcible rape.” And only males can perpetrate “forcible rape.” Because it literally. requires. penis. to. vagina. contact.

The Handbook further reads:

Agencies must not classify statutory rape, incest, or other sex offenses, i.e. forcible sodomy, sexual assault with an object, forcible fondling, etc. as Forcible Rape (2a or 2b).

Page 20, emphasis in original.

So you see, according to NATIONAL CRIME STATISTICS, non-PIV sexual violence is. not. rape. Even statutory rape is excluded from the definition of “forcible rape!” This makes a lot of people very, very upset. Understandably, so. Now, me? Yes. And no. Here’s the thing: I don’t believe that rape is rape is rape is the same as all other rape. I would argue in favor of different classifications of “rape” that take into account penetration, exploitation of power (see Chapter 6 of the Swedish Penal Code as example), and potential or incurred damages. But that is not what we have here.

Here, the FBI has created one very narrow, difficult to prove, definition of rape; then dumps everything else into a second category called “Sex Offenses.” A “sex offense” is simply a catch-all description for non-PIV sexual violence:

This classification includes all sex offenses except forcible rape, prostitution, and commercialized vice.

Page 142. As such, this framework of national reporting fails to classify many acts of unwanted sexual penetration as rape. It also fails to account for important differences between the various non-PIV crimes it shoves under the umbrella term “Sex Offenses.”

But guess what? It gets better! Let me tell you what I think this is the most appalling part of the guidance offered in the Handbook:

The ability of the victim to give consent must be a professional determination by the law enforcement agency. The age of the victim, of course, plays a critical role in this determination. Individuals do not mature mentally at the same rate. Certainly, no 4-year old is capable of consenting, where victims aged 10 or 12 may need to be assessed within the specific circumstances.

Page 142, my emphasis.

ARE YOU KIDDING ME? This is in the OFFICIAL FBI MANUAL OF CRIME REPORTING. And guess what? The exact. same. language. is also featured in the section on Forcible Rape (see page 19). So this pedophilic instruction is given by the government not once, but TWICE!

Ten and twelve-year-old children can NOT, as a matter of state law, consent to sexual contact with adults. I’m sorry people, but sometimes getting all BLACK & WHITE on certain egregious behaviors is appropriate. And this is one where I’m willing to risk Laying Down the Law like there are no legit exceptions. The FBI guidance about ten and twelve year old victims being “assessed within the specific circumstances” NEEDS TO GO. There should be a clear prohibition on sexual contact with a child aged sixteen (or younger) by any person two (or more) years older or younger in age than the child. None. End. Teenagers, find people your own age, or WAIT. Yes, that’s how I really feel. And I could probably get even more complicated about the wording, but I won’t. For now.

Articles about the FBI’s current working definition of rape also discuss the statistical increase in crimes that would inevitably occur if the FBI’s antique definition of “forcible rape” were updated. But really, what would the problem be? First of all, we’d know exactly why the increase has occurred. No need for alarm, people! But more importantly, we’d have a clearer picture of reality with a better understanding of all victims’ experiences. And this new accounting of reality just might result in increased resources and funding for the victims of these crimes. Finally, there is considerable difference in state definitions of rape. Most of them look nothing like the “forcible rape” definition used by the FBI. Comparing apples to statistical oranges inevitably produces misrepresentations. Uniform criminal reporting standards that more accurately captured a greater range of sexual crimes would encourage state adoption and therefore, consistency. Women would benefit from shared legal definitions of “rape” and “sexual assault” that better reflect our experiences by making more detailed analyses of the circumstances.

So let’s do that.

I believe that one of our tasks as feminists is to conceptualize new ways of describing women’s experiences. In this case, experiences of sexual violation. That’s why I think this is the most feminist-interesting part of the Handbook’s guidance. The factors mentioned below help inform our task because they legitimize concern for damages:

Sexual attacks on males are included in this classification [Sex Offenses]. However, depending on the nature of the crime and the extent of the injury, the offense could be classified as an assault. (See explanation of assaults on page 23 of this handbook.)

Page 142, my emphasis.

Let’s start with extent of the injury, which of course is about actual damages. A feminist analysis of rape and sexual assault would take into account all kinds of injuries and their severity/extent, including (but not limited to):

  • emotional distress
  • bodily injury
  • disease transmission; symptoms and curability
  • impregnation
I know it’s hard for some people to read impregnation as a form of injury but, particularly in the context of rape, framing unwanted impregnation as a unique kind of personal damage/injury should be understandable to most. Separate consideration should be made for each of the different kinds of injuries that a person sustains as a result of rape and/or sexual assault. Including pregnancy.
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In addition to kind and extent, potential injury is also relevant to criminal severity. At least when it comes to aggravated assault, potential counts. The Handbook advises law enforcement agencies:

It is not necessary that injury result from an aggravated assault when a gun, knife, or other weapon that could cause serious personal injury is used.

Page 24, my emphasis.
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Here, potential injury from a weapon becomes relevant to the aggravated classification of the crime. Aggravation could therefore provide support for the feminist claim that PIV and/or Male-on-Female penetration has a similar quality of increased “deadliness”– by way of impregnation and disease. Aggravation analysis increases the criminal severity of an act because of the potential damage created by the presence of something in particular: death or severe bodily harm in the case of assault with a weapon, and impregnation and/or disease transmission in the case of sexual assault with a penis (against a female body).
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Aggravated assault also recognizes that not all weapons are created equally. The Handbook has sub-sections describing different kinds of weapons commonly used in the commission of assault (4a- firearm; 4b- knife or cutting instrument; 4c- other dangerous weapon; 4d- hands, fists, feet, aggravated injury). Unfortunately, the federal government does not recognize the danger of impregnation as a potential, or even actual, harm. And even more unfortunately, according the FBI, female victims of “forcible rape” -and victims of all “sexual offenses”-  do not have an aggravated classification for reporting the sexual crimes committed against them.
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Further, transmission of disease by non-sexual methods such as biting or spitting is specifically addressed in the Handbook’s discussion of aggravated assault (see page 24). Yet disease transmission is a conspicuously absent from guidance about Forcible Rape and Sexual Offenses (see page 19-20 and 142-143, respectively).
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A feminist analysis of sexual violence and potential injury would review the nature of the crime and consider aggravating circumstances such as:
  • a power differential/relationship between the parties, including age and threat of retaliation
  • a physical size or ability differential
  • the use of physical force or threat thereof
  • use/threat of a weapon; kind of weapon (deadly or otherwise)
  • PIV/reproductive violation
  • exchange of bodily fluids (disease transmission)
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The presence of any one of these factors justifies an increase in the severity of the crime being reported. Combined consideration for actual and potential damages should be built into our nationally recognized standards of reportable sex-crimes. Most of this is already being done for assaults. Why not sexual crimes too?
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